Showing posts with label Failed Banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Failed Banks. Show all posts

Monday, February 2, 2009


The New York Times

February 2, 2009

Big Risks for U.S. in Trying to Value Bad Bank Assets

As the Obama administration prepares its strategy to rescue the nation’s banks by buying or guaranteeing troubled assets on their books, it confronts one central problem: How should they be valued?

Not just billions, but hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars are at stake.

The Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, is expected to announce details of the new plan within weeks. Administration and Congressional officials say it will give the government flexibility to buy some bad assets and guarantee others in an effort to have a broad impact but still tailor the aid for different institutions.

But getting this right will not be easy. The wild variations on the value of many bad bank assets can be seen by looking at one mortgage-backed bond recently analyzed by a division of Standard & Poor’s, the credit rating agency.

The financial institution that owns the bond calculates the value at 97 cents on the dollar, or a mere 3 percent loss. But S.& P. estimates it is worth 87 cents, based on the current loan-default rate, and could be worth 53 cents under a bleaker situation that contemplates a doubling of defaults. But even that might be optimistic, because the bond traded recently for just 38 cents on the dollar, reflecting the even gloomier outlook of investors.

The bond analyzed by S.& P. is just one of thousands that the government might buy or guarantee should it go forward with setting up a “bad bank” that would acquire $1 trillion or more of toxic assets from banks.

The idea is that, free from the burden of carrying these bad assets, banks would start lending again and bolster the faltering economy. The bad bank set up by the government would, over time, sell the assets and recover some or most of what it had paid.

While the government is considering several approaches to helping the banks, including more capital injections, buying or insuring toxic assets is likely to be a centerpiece. Determining the right price for these assets is crucial to success. Placing too low a value would force institutions selling and others holding similar investments to register crushing losses that could deplete their capital and make it harder for them to increase lending.

But inflated values would bail out the companies, their shareholders and executives at the expense of taxpayers, who would swallow the losses if the government could not recoup what it had paid.

Some critics of the plan warn that the government should not buy the assets, because banks will try to get too high a price and leave taxpayers holding the bag.

“To date, the banks have stuck their heads in the sand,” said Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant for the Securities and Exchange Commission, “and demanded that they be paid the price of good apples for bad apples.”

But many believe that, given the depth of the problem and the fact that it keeps getting worse, the government has little choice.

Finance experts from Wall Street and academia are advising the administration on other options. To sidestep the thorny valuation problem, some have suggested that the bad bank acquire only assets that have already been marked down significantly and guarantee other assets, but officials would have just as difficult a task in determining how much to charge for insuring risky assets.

Economists predict that the cost of the program will most likely exceed the $350 billion remaining in the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program that Congress approved in October.

They say the Obama administration may need upwards of $1 trillion in additional aid for banks — on top of the more than $800 billion the administration is seeking in an economic stimulus measure moving through Congress.

Many in Washington question whether the rescue has achieved its goal of stabilizing the financial markets. A report by the Government Accountability Office on Friday concluded that whether the bailout program had been effective might never be known.

“While the package helped avoid a financial collapse, many are frustrated by the results — and rightfully so,” President Obama said in hisweekly address on Saturday. “Too often taxpayer dollars have been spent without transparency or accountability. Banks have been extended a hand, but homeowners, students, and small businesses that need loans have been left to fend on their own.”

Mr. Obama and many lawmakers have expressed anger that banks that received the first batch of aid money do not appear to have increased their lending significantly, even as some firms have spent billions on bonuses, corporate jets and other perks. In two weeks the House will hold a hearing to ask chief executives of the eight largest banks about their spending controls.

As early as this week, the Treasury Department may impose new limits on the executive pay of companies receiving financial assistance. The Oversight Panel created by Congress to monitor the program is also expected to publish a report this week looking at whether the government paid too much to the large banks that they have provided with assistance.

A frequent refrain in Washington and on Wall Street is that there are no current market prices for toxic securities. But people who buy and sell these investments say that is a simplistic reading of the problem. They say most kinds of securities can be valued and are being traded, but trading has slowed as sellers and buyers disagree about what that the price should be.

The value of these securities is based on the future cash flow they provide to investors. To determine that, traders have to make assumptions about the housing market and the economy: How high will the unemployment rate go in the coming years? How many borrowers will default? What will homes be worth?

The Standard & Poor’s group, Market, Credit and Risk Strategies, which operates independently from the company’s credit ratings business, has been studying troubled securities for investors and banks. The bond that is trading at 38 cents provides a vivid illustration of the dilemma in valuing these assets.

The bond is backed by 9,000 second mortgages used by borrowers who put down little or no money to buy homes. Nearly a quarter of the loans are delinquent, and losses on defaulted mortgages are averaging 40 percent. The security once had a top rating, triple-A.

Michael G. Thompson, a managing director at the S.& P. group, says his computer models can easily calculate what the bond is worth under different situations. “This is not rocket science, this is straight bond math,” he said. But determining what the future holds is much harder. “We are not masters of the universe who can predict the macroeconomic environment,” he added

Some would-be buyers of these assets fear that a deep recession could drive up default rates and push down home prices much further. They also worry that a cataclysm like the failure of a big bank could send prices tumbling again, just as the collapse of Lehman Brothersdid in September. Others see no reason to bid up prices because those who need to sell are desperate.

Big banks and other owners of mortgage investments have argued that the low market prices reflect fire sales. Many have classified such securities as level-three assets, for which accounting rules allow them to determine values using computer models rather than the marketplace. Mr. Thompson estimates that at the end of September financial firms had $600 billion in such hard-to-value assets.

But critics like Mr. Turner say that the banks’ accounting for these assets cannot be trusted because they have an incentive to use optimistic assumptions.

In some instances, the government has guaranteed losses on certain assets for big, systemically important companies like Citigroup andBank of America.

Policy makers have found such arrangements appealing because they do not require upfront payments and they can be customized for each bank, Douglas J. Elliott, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote in a recent paper.

Still, government guarantees need to be based on sound valuations, Mr. Elliott and others say. If the government underestimates the risks of default, taxpayers could eventually lose tens of billions of dollars. The cost of insuring such assets in the private market is often several times greater than the price the government is charging banks.

Whatever approach the Obama administration takes, investors and policy makers say it should provide more and clearer information about the health of banks and the risks that the government is taking.

Many analysts do not trust what they are told about the quality of the securities and loans held by banks and other financial firms. Most banks provide only a very general description of their holdings, because they consider the information privileged.

But the government, using its power as a big investor, could compel the banks to divulge more specific data, without giving away the names of individual bonds or loans, analysts said. The market could then do its own analysis on what the assets are worth.

“At least it would give the government one objective measure of the value of these assets,” said Anthony Lembke, co-head of investments at MKP Capital Management, a hedge fund firm that is a big investor in mortgages. “In the absence of transparency and clarity, investors are going to assume a value that will be conservative and then add a risk premium.”


 

Friday, January 16, 2009

"Ring Fencing" Bank of America

from www.federalreserve.gov

January 15, 2009

Summary of Terms

Eligible Asset Guarantee

Eligible Assets: A pool of financial instruments consisting of securities
backed by residential and commercial real estate loans and
corporate debt, derivative transactions that reference such
securities, loans, and associated hedges, as agreed, and
such other financial instruments as the U.S. government
(USG) has agreed to guarantee or lend against (the Pool).
Each specific financial instrument in the Pool must be
identified on signing of the guarantee agreement. Financial
instruments in the Pool will remain on the books of
institution but will be appropriately “ring‐fenced.”

The following financial instruments will be excluded from
the Pool: (i) foreign assets (definition to be provided by
USG); (ii) assets originated or issued on or after March 14,
2008; (iii) equity securities; and (iv) any other assets that
USG deems necessary to exclude.

Size: The Pool contains up to $118 billion of financial
instruments. More specifically, the Pool includes cash
assets with a current book (i.e., carrying) value of up to
$37 billion and a derivatives portfolio with maximum
potential future losses of up to $81 billion (based on
valuations agreed between institution and USG).

Term and Coverage of Guarantee:

Guarantee is in place for 10 years for residential assets and
5 years for non‐residential assets. Residential assets will
include loans secured solely by 1‐4 family residential real
estate, securities predominately collateralized by such
loans, and derivatives that predominately reference such
securities.
Institution has the right to terminate the
guarantee at any time (with the consent of USG), and the
parties will negotiate in good faith as to an appropriate fee
or rebate in connection with any permitted termination. If
institution terminates the guarantee, it must prepay any
January 15, 2009 outstanding Federal Reserve loan (described below) in full.

Guarantee covers Eligible Losses on the Pool. Eligible
Losses are the aggregate incurred credit losses (net of any
gains and recoveries) on the Pool during the term of the
guarantee, beyond the January 15, 2009, marks and credit
valuation adjustments for the Pool (as agreed between
institution and USG). Eligible Losses do not include
unrealized mark‐to‐market losses but do include realized
losses from a sale permitted under the asset management
template (described below).
Deductible: Institution absorbs all Eligible Losses in the Pool up to
$10 billion.


USG (UST/FDIC) will share Eligible Losses in the Pool in
excess of that amount, up to $10 billion. All Eligible Losses
beyond the institution’s deductible will be shared USG
(90%) and institution (10%).

Financing: Federal Reserve will provide a non‐recourse loan facility to
institution, subject to institution’s 10% loss sharing.
Federal Reserve loan commitment will terminate (and any
loans thereunder will mature) on the termination dates of
USG guarantee. Institution has the right to terminate the
Federal Reserve loan commitment and prepay any Federal
Reserve loans at any time (with consent of Federal
Reserve).

Federal Reserve will charge a fee on undrawn amounts of
20 bp per annum and a floating interest rate on drawn
amounts of OIS plus 300 bp per annum. Interest and fee
payments will be with recourse to the institution.

Institution may draw on Federal Reserve loan facility if and
when additional mark‐to‐market and incurred credit losses
on the Pool reach $18 billion.

January 15, 2009
Fee for Guarantee – Preferred Stock and Warrants:

Institution will issue to USG (UST/FDIC) (i) $4 billion of
preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate (under terms
described below); and (ii) warrants with an aggregate
exercise value of 10% of the total amount of preferred
issued. The fee may be adjusted, as necessary, based on
the results of an actuarial analysis of the final composition
of the Pool, as required under section 102(c) of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.

Management of Assets:
Institution generally will manage the financial instruments
in the Pool in accordance with its ordinary business
practices, but will be required to comply with an asset
management template provided by USG. This template will
require institution, among other things, to obtain USG
approval (not to be unreasonably withheld) before any
Material Disposition. A Material Disposition is a disposition
of financial instruments in the Pool that creates an Eligible
Loss that, combined with other dispositions of Pool
instruments in the same year, exceeds 1% of the Pool size
at the beginning of the year. This template also will
include, among other things, a foreclosure mitigation policy
acceptable to USG.

Revenues and Risk Weighting:
Institution will retain the income stream from the Pool.
Risk weighting for the financial instruments in the Pool will
be 20%.

Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock
dividends in excess of $.01 per share per quarter for three
years without USG consent. A factor taken into account for
consideration of USG consent is the ability to complete a
common stock offering of appropriate size.

Executive Compensation:
An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that
rewards long‐term performance and profitability, with
appropriate limitations, must be submitted to, and
January 15, 2009
approved by, USG. Executive compensation requirements
will be consistent with the terms of the preferred stock
purchase agreement between USG and institution.

Corporate Governance:
Other matters as specified, consistent with the terms of the
preferred stock purchase agreement between USG and
institution.

The foregoing is accepted and agreed
by and among the following as of
January 15, 2009:

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP




So we now have the playbook on how the government will ring-fence (nationalize? I guess its a matter of semantics at this point) the big banks. None of the systematically important big banks will be allowed to fail. The government will provide guarantees on bad assets. It might be better to actually remove these assets from the balance sheets and create a bad bank. This will provide the banks will more confidence to lend. But this shouldnt be done without mechanisms for appropriate oversight. This move is important and is a good move. It begins to restore confidence in the financials. Transparency is still missing but hopefully the new administration will be able to provide that in the future. The tackling of insolvency has begun in the first quarter and overall this is very positive news. There are still other institutions out there. We need to get those under control asap as well. This slow bleed - Countrywide, Merill, Wachovia, Freddie / Fannie, AIG, Bank of America is unfortunate. There are others with bad assets - those should all be dealt with speedily and in this quarter!

Sunday, October 26, 2008

Insolvency!

from paul.kedrosky.com


October 23, 2008
The Bank Capital Mirage
The following more or less supports what some have been saying for a while -– that major banks in the U.S. and the U.K. will end up being entirely nationalized before this crisis is over –- but it's still a striking way of looking at the data. The gist: Government recapitalization and other fund-raising has largely been in service of banks' prior subprime losses, while corporate and consumer loans are just starting to hit bank balance sheets. It won't take much to tip banks over into insolvency again.









[via Bloomberg]


Also from ftalphaville.ft.com


This is a singularly arresting chart (same as the one posted above):
It’s Bloomberg’s chart of the day and has been reproduced by Paul Kedrosky on his blog, Infectious Greed.







Kedrosky writes:
The following more or less supports what some have been saying for a while — that major banks in the U.S. and the U.K. will end up being entirely nationalized before this crisis is over — but it’s still a striking way of looking at the data. The gist: Government recapitalization and other fund-raising has largely been in service of banks’ prior subprime losses, while corporate and consumer loans are just starting to hit bank balance sheets. It won’t take much to tip banks over into insolvency again.


This is frightening stuff. Not least because the Fed’s own balance sheet is not looking healthy. Via Brad Setser at the CFR, here’s Paul Swartz’s latest graph:






The balance sheet is likely to grow further too. Jan Hatzius, Goldman’s chief economist has pointed out that during the Japanese credit crisis of the 1990s, the Bank of Japan ended up with a balance sheet equivalent to 30 per cent of GDP. The Fed’s is currently 12 per cent. And on Wednesday the Fed made this announcement:


The Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday announced that it will alter the formula used to determine the interest rate paid to depository institutions on excess balances.
Previously, the rate on excess balances had been set as the lowest federal funds rate target established by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in effect during the reserve maintenance period minus 75 basis points. Under the new formula, the rate on excess balances will be set equal to the lowest FOMC target rate in effect during the reserve maintenance period less 35 basis points. This change will become effective for the maintenance periods beginning Thursday, October 23.


Which is an admission, basically, that the Fed lost control of the Federal Funds Rate. And if that needed proving, take a look at the graph from the New York Fed:








Lastly a nice picture courtesy of http://www.ridingthedax.com/

http://www.ridingthedax.com/2008/10/23/bubble-banks-revisited/






I have been harping for a while about insolvency issues. Looks like many others are catching on. The is one of the first issues that needs to be tackled. Unfortunately President Bush has made it clear that Nationalization wont happen on his watch. Volcker mentioned that banks have been "effectively" nationalized either overtly or through other lines by the Fed. But this is lack of clarity as many of these banks have market capitalizations well in excess of their balance sheet worthiness. What we vitally need right now is clarity (read the end of the insolvency issues) and then an INTELLIGENT strategy to combat the simultaneous develeraging of both banking and consumer levels -(regulating derivatives, debt restructuring of consumers, creation more jobs in the creation of tangible goods in the US, simultaneous creation of incentives for savings and increasing money velocity) etc.

Thursday, September 25, 2008

How the Swedes Did It

from nytimes.com
September 23, 2008
Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way
By CARTER DOUGHERTY

A banking system in crisis after the collapse of a housing bubble. An economy hemorrhaging jobs. A market-oriented government struggling to stem the panic. Sound familiar?
It does to Sweden. The country was so far in the hole in 1992 — after years of imprudent regulation, short-sighted economic policy and the end of its property boom — that its banking system was, for all practical purposes, insolvent.

But Sweden took a different course than the one now being proposed by the United States Treasury. And Swedish officials say there are lessons from their own nightmare that Washington may be missing.

Sweden did not just bail out its financial institutions by having the government take over the bad debts. It extracted pounds of flesh from bank shareholders before writing checks. Banks had to write down losses and issue warrants to the government.

That strategy held banks responsible and turned the government into an owner. When distressed assets were sold, the profits flowed to taxpayers, and the government was able to recoup more money later by selling its shares in the companies as well.

“If I go into a bank,” said Bo Lundgren, who was Sweden’s finance minister at the time, “I’d rather get equity so that there is some upside for the taxpayer.”

Sweden spent 4 percent of its gross domestic product, or 65 billion kronor, the equivalent of $11.7 billion at the time, or $18.3 billion in today’s dollars, to rescue ailing banks. That is slightly less, proportionate to the national economy, than the $700 billion, or roughly 5 percent of gross domestic product, that the Bush administration estimates its own move will cost in the United States.

But the final cost to Sweden ended up being less than 2 percent of its G.D.P. Some officials say they believe it was closer to zero, depending on how certain rates of return are calculated.
The tumultuous events of the last few weeks have produced a lot of tight-lipped nods in Stockholm. Mr. Lundgren even made the rounds in New York in early September, explaining what the country did in the early 1990s.

A few American commentators have proposed that the United States government extract equity from banks as a price for their rescue. But it does not seem to be under serious consideration yet in the Bush administration or Congress.

The reason is not quite clear. The government has already swapped its sovereign guarantee for equity in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage finance institutions, and the American International Group, the global insurance giant.

Putting taxpayers on the hook without anything in return could be a mistake, said Urban Backstrom, a senior Swedish finance ministry official at the time. “The public will not support a plan if you leave the former shareholders with anything,” he said.

The Swedish crisis had strikingly similar origins to the American one, and its neighbors, Norway and Finland, were hobbled to the point of needing a government bailout to escape the morass as well.

Financial deregulation in the 1980s fed a frenzy of real estate lending by Sweden’s banks, which did not worry enough about whether the value of their collateral might evaporate in tougher times.

Property prices imploded. The bubble deflated fast in 1991 and 1992. A vain effort to defend Sweden’s currency, the krona, caused overnight interest rates to spike at one point to 500 percent. The Swedish economy contracted for two consecutive years after a long expansion, and unemployment, at 3 percent in 1990, quadrupled in three years.

After a series of bank failures and ad hoc solutions, the moment of truth arrived in September 1992, when the government of Prime Minister Carl Bildt decided it was time to clear the decks.
Standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the opposition center-left, Mr. Bildt’s conservative government announced that the Swedish state would guarantee all bank deposits and creditors of the nation’s 114 banks. Sweden formed a new agency to supervise institutions that needed recapitalization, and another that sold off the assets, mainly real estate, that the banks held as collateral.

Sweden told its banks to write down their losses promptly before coming to the state for recapitalization. Facing its own problem later in the decade, Japan made the mistake of dragging this process out, delaying a solution for years.

Then came the imperative to bleed shareholders first. Mr. Lundgren recalls a conversation with Peter Wallenberg, at the time chairman of SEB, Sweden’s largest bank. Mr. Wallenberg, the scion of the country’s most famous family and steward of large chunks of its economy, heard that there would be no sacred cows.

The Wallenbergs turned around and arranged a recapitalization on their own, obviating the need for a bailout. SEB turned a profit the following year, 1993.

“For every krona we put into the bank, we wanted the same influence,” Mr. Lundgren said. “That ensured that we did not have to go into certain banks at all.”

By the end of the crisis, the Swedish government had seized a vast portion of the banking sector, and the agency had mostly fulfilled its hard-nosed mandate to drain share capital before injecting cash. When markets stabilized, the Swedish state then reaped the benefits by taking the banks public again.

More money may yet come into official coffers. The government still owns 19.9 percent of Nordea, a Stockholm bank that was fully nationalized and is now a highly regarded giant in Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea region.

The politics of Sweden’s crisis management were similarly tough-minded, though much quieter.
Soon after the plan was announced, the Swedish government found that international confidence returned more quickly than expected, easing pressure on its currency and bringing money back into the country. The center-left opposition, while wary that the government might yet let the banks off the hook, made its points about penalizing shareholders privately.

“The only thing that held back an avalanche was the hope that the system was holding,” said Leif Pagrotzky, a senior member of the opposition at the time. “In public we stuck together 100 percent, but we fought behind the scenes.”

China Banks say NO! to US Banks

China banks told to halt lending to US banks-SCMP
Wed Sep 24, 2008 9:52pm EDT

BEIJING, Sept 25 (Reuters) - Chinese regulators have told domestic banks to stop interbank lending to U.S. financial institutions to prevent possible losses during the financial crisis, the South China Morning Post reported on Thursday.

The Hong Kong newspaper cited unidentified industry sources as saying the instruction from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) applied to interbank lending of all currencies to U.S. banks but not to banks from other countries.

"The decree appears to be Beijing's first attempt to erect defences against the deepening U.S. financial meltdown after the mainland's major lenders reported billions of U.S. dollars in exposure to the credit crisis," the SCMP said.
A spokesman for the CBRC had no immediate comment. (Reporting by Alan Wheatley and Langi Chiang; editing by Ken Wills)

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Wednesday, September 24, 2008

Failed Bank Specialist JC Flowers starts moving in

Flowers, LBO Investor, Approved to Buy Missouri Bank (Update1)
By Jonathan Keehner and Jason Kelly

Sept. 23 (Bloomberg) -- J. Christopher Flowers, founder of private-equity firm J.C. Flowers & Co., was approved by U.S. regulators to acquire the First National Bank of Cainesville in Missouri, a move that may allow him to buy other lenders.

The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency cleared the purchase by Flowers personally on Aug. 27, according to a public filing by the regulator. He may use the bank, which has assets of about $14 million, as a platform to buy failed institutions, according to a person close to Flowers, who asked not to be identified because the plans are private.

Flowers's deal comes as private-equity investors press the Federal Reserve to loosen regulations that limit their ability to invest in and influence management of banks. The Fed yesterday released revised guidelines for minority investments in banks, and New York-based J.C. Flowers & Co. is among the firms seeking controlling stakes to profit from the U.S. financial crisis.

``Their competitive advantage is to team up with experts in the industry and really make changes in the business,'' said Robert Kennedy, a partner with the law firm Jones Day in New York. ``That's the piece of financial-institution investing that's been unavailable.''

While buyout firms want the flexibility to buy controlling investments in banks, they are wary of becoming a bank holding company. That status would trigger restrictions on non-banking activities and the amount of debt they can take on. To avoid that classification, some individuals from private-equity firms have considered acquiring banks.

Small Bank
Such was the case with Flowers's Missouri deal, which may be a template for other transactions. First National Bank of Cainesville was the 17th smallest bank in Missouri, by deposits, of the 397 listed on the Web site of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. as of June 2007.

``An individual cannot be a bank holding company,'' said Mark Tenhundfeld, director of regulatory policy at the American Bankers Association, a Washington-based trade association, who was unaware of any other major private-equity firm head having bought a bank. ``If the OCC approves a change in bank control proposal by an individual, then that person may avoid bank holding-company regulations.''

An individual may also be able to co-invest with private- equity funds and still avoid bank holding-company classification if those funds take a noncontrolling stake in the bank, according to Tenhundfeld.

Model Deal
The revised Fed guidelines raised the threshold for such stakes to 33 percent from 25 percent.
Flowers, a former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. investment banker, may expand the First National Bank of Cainesville ``by means of internal growth or through the acquisition of troubled or failed depository institutions,'' according to the OCC's filing. Other businesses in Cainsville, a community of 400 in northern Missouri near the Iowa border, include A Thyme to Sow Herb Farm and the Wing Tip Hunting Preserve, according to the town's Web site.

``I don't see why this move by Flowers couldn't be repeated,'' said the ABA's Tenhundfeld. ``This could be a model for private-equity firms looking to acquire banks.''

J.C. Flowers & Co. spokesman Edward Grebow declined to comment. The private-equity firm has led minority investments in banks including buying a 23 percent stake in Japan's Shinsei Bank Ltd. and a 24 percent stake in Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Germany's second-biggest commercial property lender.

Silo Approach
J.C. Flowers & Co. has also invested in non-banking companies, such as derivatives broker MF Global Ltd.

Making controlling investments plays more directly into private-equity firms' main business model -- using cash and borrowed money to buy troubled companies, fix them and sell them for a profit. Minority investments by buyout firms in Washington Mutual Inc. and National City Corp. have plummeted in value amid the ongoing U.S. financial crisis.

The Fed has explored ways for private-equity to take control of struggling U.S. banks, in addition to yesterday's guidance that loosens some restrictions on non-controlling stakes.
Such minority stakes don't ``allow them to do the things they like to do, which is to take over improve operations,'' said Jones Day's Kennedy. ``They're not typically passive investors.''

With the turbulent state of the banking industry, private- equity firms are more likely interested in controlling banks, such as through a ``silo'' structure that would be walled off from other investments in an attempt to keep Federal oversight of banking companies from their other holdings.

In the silo concept, a fund is specifically designated to own a bank and nothing else. That isolates the investment from other funds, and other companies, under the private-equity firm's control.
To contact the reporter on this story: Jonathan Keehner in New York jkeehner@bloomberg.net; Jason Kelly in New York at jkelly14@bloomberg.net. Last Updated: September 23, 2008 18:03 EDT