Moody’s to Review $302.6 Billion in Commercial Debt (Update2)
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By Sarah Mulholland
Feb. 5 (Bloomberg) -- Moody’s Investors Service is reviewing the ratings of $302.6 billion in commercial mortgage-backed securities as real-estate values drop and property owners fall behind on payments.
The review encompasses 52 percent of outstanding U.S. commercial mortgage-backed debt ranked by Moody’s, the New York- based ratings company said today in a statement. The ratings of so-called senior and mezzanine AAA bonds, the top two classes of CMBS accounting for about 72 percent of the securities being reviewed, probably won’t be affected, Moody’s said.
The U.S. recession is crimping consumer spending and hurting business growth, making it harder for commercial property owners to make their payments. Should Moody’s decide to cut the ratings, investors including banks and insurers may need to sell CMBS holdings to maintain required levels of capital.
“Property values declined sharply in 2008, and we anticipate further declines over the next 12 to 24 months,” Moody’s analyst Nick Levidy said in the statement. “Delinquencies on CMBS loans are also on the rise, and we expect the pace to accelerate as macroeconomic pressures take a toll on property cash flows.”
Moody’s said it may downgrade the lowest levels of the securities by an average of four to five levels. Many of the securities are trading at levels that already suggest their ratings were lowered.
The gap, or spread, on commercial mortgage-backed bonds relative to benchmark interest rates has soared in the past year on concern that defaults will rise. Top-rated commercial real estate securities are trading at about 10.3 percentage points more than the swap rate, compared with 1.8 percentage points a year ago, Bank of America Corp. data show. The swap rate is currently 3.154 percent.
Fait Accompli
“This was already a fait accompli in the market,” said David Castillo, a senior trader of structured-finance bonds at Further Lane Securities in San Francisco.
Sales of the securities plummeted to $12.2 billion last year, compared with a record $237 billion in 2007, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. data.
To contact the reporter on this story: Sarah Mulholland in New York at smulholland3@bloomberg.net Last Updated: February 5, 2009 16:09 EST
Here we go. Review, Downgrade, Markdown, Bailout. Yee haw! The banks are insolvent dammit. Nationalize them and get this over with. Ofcourse game theory dictates that uncertainty on one hand makes things worse for the economy and on the other hand makes Treasury debt popular. Right now, the Treasury is focused on raising money for the Fed at cheap rates and therefore they'll try to keep certainty from coming back into the market. For now. At some point Obama has to make an executive decision here and say enough with the uncertainty - the damage that is being caused to "animal spirits" in the economy is unacceptable.
Showing posts with label Treasury. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Treasury. Show all posts
Friday, February 6, 2009
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Geithner on Bailout Lobbying: NO
Geithner Sets Limits on Lobbying for Bailout Money
WASHINGTON — The Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, announced on Tuesday that he would crack down on lobbying to influence the $700 billion financial bailout program by the companies that are receiving billions in taxpayer funds.
Mr. Geithner, who was confirmed and sworn in on Monday, said that he would also set new limits intended to prevent political interference with the decisions about which firms receive bailout money.
The announcement followed several reports about efforts by corporate lobbyists and Congressional lawmakers to influence the program, including decisions about which banks should receive taxpayer money.
“American taxpayers deserve to know that their money is spent in the most effective way to stabilize the financial system,” Mr. Geithner said in a statement. “Today’s actions reaffirm our commitment toward that goal.”
The details of the rules — the text has not been completed — were not released. But in a news release, the Treasury Department outlined the Obama administration’s intent to prevent corporate and political lobbying to influence spending of the bailout program.
Among the changes will be rules to “combat lobbyist influence” over the bailout program, including restricting officials from “contacts with lobbyists in connection with applications for, or disbursements of” bailout funds, the department said.
The New York Times reported on Saturday that at least a dozen firms that received billions from the bailout program lobbied the government about the program in the final three months of 2008, according to a review of disclosure forms.
The new rules announced Tuesday will also “ensure that political influence does not interfere” with bailout decisions, “using as a model for these protections the limits on political influence over tax matters,” the Treasury Department said.
A Treasury Department spokeswoman said the tax safeguards that would form the basis of the new bailout policy include a federal statute prohibiting high-ranking executive branch officials from intervening in individual tax disputes, like ordering the Internal Revenue Service to conduct or terminate an audit of a particular taxpayer.
The safeguards include the agency’s refusal “to accept any political interference whatsoever in individual tax matters,” the spokeswoman said.
While such a policy would block high-ranking executive branch officials from steering bailout money to a particular bank, it was not immediately clear whether the rule would also prohibit Treasury officials from talking with lawmakers who are seeking help for banks in their districts.
The Wall Street Journal reported last Thursday that several lawmakers had tried to ensure that bailout funds would go to banks in their districts, although it said there was no way to prove that such efforts were linked to a later decision to give money to a particular bank.
Also on Tuesday, Mr. Geithner said that the Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Stability, in making reports to Congress about how it was disbursing the funds, would certify that each decision was based only on objective “investment criteria and the facts of the case.”
In addition, the department said that it would publish soon a detailed description of its investment review process and that only banks recommended by their primary bank regulator would be eligible for bailout funds.
The announcement on Tuesday represented the latest step by the Obama administration to make the bailout program more open and accountable as it moves to disburse the second $350 billion, following bipartisan criticism over the Bush administration’s handling of the first $350 billion of the bailout program.
The Obama administration has said it will step up monitoring of lending patterns by financial institutions that receive bailout money to make sure the money is being used to ease the credit squeeze. It also said it would seek to limit executive compensation at banks that receive future taxpayer help.
During his Senate confirmation hearings last week, Mr. Geithner said that the bailout program needed “serious reform” and pledged that the Obama administration would impose “tough conditions to protect the taxpayer and the necessary transparency to allow the American people to see how and where their money is being spent and the results those investments are delivering.”
He added: “And we are going to do that. This is an important program and we need to make it work.”
Friday, January 16, 2009
"Ring Fencing" Bank of America
from www.federalreserve.gov
January 15, 2009
Summary of Terms
Eligible Asset Guarantee
Eligible Assets: A pool of financial instruments consisting of securities
backed by residential and commercial real estate loans and
corporate debt, derivative transactions that reference such
securities, loans, and associated hedges, as agreed, and
such other financial instruments as the U.S. government
(USG) has agreed to guarantee or lend against (the Pool).
Each specific financial instrument in the Pool must be
identified on signing of the guarantee agreement. Financial
instruments in the Pool will remain on the books of
institution but will be appropriately “ring‐fenced.”
The following financial instruments will be excluded from
the Pool: (i) foreign assets (definition to be provided by
USG); (ii) assets originated or issued on or after March 14,
2008; (iii) equity securities; and (iv) any other assets that
USG deems necessary to exclude.
Size: The Pool contains up to $118 billion of financial
instruments. More specifically, the Pool includes cash
assets with a current book (i.e., carrying) value of up to
$37 billion and a derivatives portfolio with maximum
potential future losses of up to $81 billion (based on
valuations agreed between institution and USG).
Term and Coverage of Guarantee:
Guarantee is in place for 10 years for residential assets and
5 years for non‐residential assets. Residential assets will
include loans secured solely by 1‐4 family residential real
estate, securities predominately collateralized by such
loans, and derivatives that predominately reference such
securities. Institution has the right to terminate the
guarantee at any time (with the consent of USG), and the
parties will negotiate in good faith as to an appropriate fee
or rebate in connection with any permitted termination. If
institution terminates the guarantee, it must prepay any
January 15, 2009 outstanding Federal Reserve loan (described below) in full.
Guarantee covers Eligible Losses on the Pool. Eligible
Losses are the aggregate incurred credit losses (net of any
gains and recoveries) on the Pool during the term of the
guarantee, beyond the January 15, 2009, marks and credit
valuation adjustments for the Pool (as agreed between
institution and USG). Eligible Losses do not include
unrealized mark‐to‐market losses but do include realized
losses from a sale permitted under the asset management
template (described below).
Deductible: Institution absorbs all Eligible Losses in the Pool up to
$10 billion.
USG (UST/FDIC) will share Eligible Losses in the Pool in
excess of that amount, up to $10 billion. All Eligible Losses
beyond the institution’s deductible will be shared USG
(90%) and institution (10%).
Financing: Federal Reserve will provide a non‐recourse loan facility to
institution, subject to institution’s 10% loss sharing.
Federal Reserve loan commitment will terminate (and any
loans thereunder will mature) on the termination dates of
USG guarantee. Institution has the right to terminate the
Federal Reserve loan commitment and prepay any Federal
Reserve loans at any time (with consent of Federal
Reserve).
Federal Reserve will charge a fee on undrawn amounts of
20 bp per annum and a floating interest rate on drawn
amounts of OIS plus 300 bp per annum. Interest and fee
payments will be with recourse to the institution.
Institution may draw on Federal Reserve loan facility if and
when additional mark‐to‐market and incurred credit losses
on the Pool reach $18 billion.
January 15, 2009
Fee for Guarantee – Preferred Stock and Warrants:
Institution will issue to USG (UST/FDIC) (i) $4 billion of
preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate (under terms
described below); and (ii) warrants with an aggregate
exercise value of 10% of the total amount of preferred
issued. The fee may be adjusted, as necessary, based on
the results of an actuarial analysis of the final composition
of the Pool, as required under section 102(c) of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
Management of Assets:
Institution generally will manage the financial instruments
in the Pool in accordance with its ordinary business
practices, but will be required to comply with an asset
management template provided by USG. This template will
require institution, among other things, to obtain USG
approval (not to be unreasonably withheld) before any
Material Disposition. A Material Disposition is a disposition
of financial instruments in the Pool that creates an Eligible
Loss that, combined with other dispositions of Pool
instruments in the same year, exceeds 1% of the Pool size
at the beginning of the year. This template also will
include, among other things, a foreclosure mitigation policy
acceptable to USG.
Revenues and Risk Weighting:
Institution will retain the income stream from the Pool.
Risk weighting for the financial instruments in the Pool will
be 20%.
Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock
dividends in excess of $.01 per share per quarter for three
years without USG consent. A factor taken into account for
consideration of USG consent is the ability to complete a
common stock offering of appropriate size.
Executive Compensation:
An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that
rewards long‐term performance and profitability, with
appropriate limitations, must be submitted to, and
January 15, 2009
approved by, USG. Executive compensation requirements
will be consistent with the terms of the preferred stock
purchase agreement between USG and institution.
Corporate Governance:
Other matters as specified, consistent with the terms of the
preferred stock purchase agreement between USG and
institution.
The foregoing is accepted and agreed
by and among the following as of
January 15, 2009:
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP
So we now have the playbook on how the government will ring-fence (nationalize? I guess its a matter of semantics at this point) the big banks. None of the systematically important big banks will be allowed to fail. The government will provide guarantees on bad assets. It might be better to actually remove these assets from the balance sheets and create a bad bank. This will provide the banks will more confidence to lend. But this shouldnt be done without mechanisms for appropriate oversight. This move is important and is a good move. It begins to restore confidence in the financials. Transparency is still missing but hopefully the new administration will be able to provide that in the future. The tackling of insolvency has begun in the first quarter and overall this is very positive news. There are still other institutions out there. We need to get those under control asap as well. This slow bleed - Countrywide, Merill, Wachovia, Freddie / Fannie, AIG, Bank of America is unfortunate. There are others with bad assets - those should all be dealt with speedily and in this quarter!
January 15, 2009
Summary of Terms
Eligible Asset Guarantee
Eligible Assets: A pool of financial instruments consisting of securities
backed by residential and commercial real estate loans and
corporate debt, derivative transactions that reference such
securities, loans, and associated hedges, as agreed, and
such other financial instruments as the U.S. government
(USG) has agreed to guarantee or lend against (the Pool).
Each specific financial instrument in the Pool must be
identified on signing of the guarantee agreement. Financial
instruments in the Pool will remain on the books of
institution but will be appropriately “ring‐fenced.”
The following financial instruments will be excluded from
the Pool: (i) foreign assets (definition to be provided by
USG); (ii) assets originated or issued on or after March 14,
2008; (iii) equity securities; and (iv) any other assets that
USG deems necessary to exclude.
Size: The Pool contains up to $118 billion of financial
instruments. More specifically, the Pool includes cash
assets with a current book (i.e., carrying) value of up to
$37 billion and a derivatives portfolio with maximum
potential future losses of up to $81 billion (based on
valuations agreed between institution and USG).
Term and Coverage of Guarantee:
Guarantee is in place for 10 years for residential assets and
5 years for non‐residential assets. Residential assets will
include loans secured solely by 1‐4 family residential real
estate, securities predominately collateralized by such
loans, and derivatives that predominately reference such
securities. Institution has the right to terminate the
guarantee at any time (with the consent of USG), and the
parties will negotiate in good faith as to an appropriate fee
or rebate in connection with any permitted termination. If
institution terminates the guarantee, it must prepay any
January 15, 2009 outstanding Federal Reserve loan (described below) in full.
Guarantee covers Eligible Losses on the Pool. Eligible
Losses are the aggregate incurred credit losses (net of any
gains and recoveries) on the Pool during the term of the
guarantee, beyond the January 15, 2009, marks and credit
valuation adjustments for the Pool (as agreed between
institution and USG). Eligible Losses do not include
unrealized mark‐to‐market losses but do include realized
losses from a sale permitted under the asset management
template (described below).
Deductible: Institution absorbs all Eligible Losses in the Pool up to
$10 billion.
USG (UST/FDIC) will share Eligible Losses in the Pool in
excess of that amount, up to $10 billion. All Eligible Losses
beyond the institution’s deductible will be shared USG
(90%) and institution (10%).
Financing: Federal Reserve will provide a non‐recourse loan facility to
institution, subject to institution’s 10% loss sharing.
Federal Reserve loan commitment will terminate (and any
loans thereunder will mature) on the termination dates of
USG guarantee. Institution has the right to terminate the
Federal Reserve loan commitment and prepay any Federal
Reserve loans at any time (with consent of Federal
Reserve).
Federal Reserve will charge a fee on undrawn amounts of
20 bp per annum and a floating interest rate on drawn
amounts of OIS plus 300 bp per annum. Interest and fee
payments will be with recourse to the institution.
Institution may draw on Federal Reserve loan facility if and
when additional mark‐to‐market and incurred credit losses
on the Pool reach $18 billion.
January 15, 2009
Fee for Guarantee – Preferred Stock and Warrants:
Institution will issue to USG (UST/FDIC) (i) $4 billion of
preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate (under terms
described below); and (ii) warrants with an aggregate
exercise value of 10% of the total amount of preferred
issued. The fee may be adjusted, as necessary, based on
the results of an actuarial analysis of the final composition
of the Pool, as required under section 102(c) of the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
Management of Assets:
Institution generally will manage the financial instruments
in the Pool in accordance with its ordinary business
practices, but will be required to comply with an asset
management template provided by USG. This template will
require institution, among other things, to obtain USG
approval (not to be unreasonably withheld) before any
Material Disposition. A Material Disposition is a disposition
of financial instruments in the Pool that creates an Eligible
Loss that, combined with other dispositions of Pool
instruments in the same year, exceeds 1% of the Pool size
at the beginning of the year. This template also will
include, among other things, a foreclosure mitigation policy
acceptable to USG.
Revenues and Risk Weighting:
Institution will retain the income stream from the Pool.
Risk weighting for the financial instruments in the Pool will
be 20%.
Dividends: Institution is prohibited from paying common stock
dividends in excess of $.01 per share per quarter for three
years without USG consent. A factor taken into account for
consideration of USG consent is the ability to complete a
common stock offering of appropriate size.
Executive Compensation:
An executive compensation plan, including bonuses, that
rewards long‐term performance and profitability, with
appropriate limitations, must be submitted to, and
January 15, 2009
approved by, USG. Executive compensation requirements
will be consistent with the terms of the preferred stock
purchase agreement between USG and institution.
Corporate Governance:
Other matters as specified, consistent with the terms of the
preferred stock purchase agreement between USG and
institution.
The foregoing is accepted and agreed
by and among the following as of
January 15, 2009:
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP
So we now have the playbook on how the government will ring-fence (nationalize? I guess its a matter of semantics at this point) the big banks. None of the systematically important big banks will be allowed to fail. The government will provide guarantees on bad assets. It might be better to actually remove these assets from the balance sheets and create a bad bank. This will provide the banks will more confidence to lend. But this shouldnt be done without mechanisms for appropriate oversight. This move is important and is a good move. It begins to restore confidence in the financials. Transparency is still missing but hopefully the new administration will be able to provide that in the future. The tackling of insolvency has begun in the first quarter and overall this is very positive news. There are still other institutions out there. We need to get those under control asap as well. This slow bleed - Countrywide, Merill, Wachovia, Freddie / Fannie, AIG, Bank of America is unfortunate. There are others with bad assets - those should all be dealt with speedily and in this quarter!
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Fed dances with AIG
from www.federalreserve.gov
Press Release
Release Date: September 16, 2008
For release at 9:00 p.m. EDT
The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday, with the full support of the Treasury Department, authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The secured loan has terms and conditions designed to protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers.
The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance.
The purpose of this liquidity facility is to assist AIG in meeting its obligations as they come due. This loan will facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner, with the least possible disruption to the overall economy.
The AIG facility has a 24-month term. Interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at a rate of three-month Libor plus 850 basis points. AIG will be permitted to draw up to $85 billion under the facility.
The interests of taxpayers are protected by key terms of the loan. The loan is collateralized by all the assets of AIG, and of its primary non-regulated subsidiaries. These assets include the stock of substantially all of the regulated subsidiaries. The loan is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the firm’s assets. The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.
2008 Other Announcements
Ok so they backstopped AIG at a very high interest rate .. LIBOR + 8.5% .. AIG should be able to borrow... should be... from the open market knowing that the Fed/Treasury have 85B line of credit to AIG. If AIG takes the loan - Fed/T expects to be repaid by selling AIG assets. All in all its an OK move... I am still concerned about what happens if AIG's liabilities exceed their assets. I would HOPE that the Fed/T loan would be considered most senior. Also worrying is the Fed is using up a substantial amount of its 800B balance sheet quickly. The Treasury is backstopping the Fed. Eventually we'll be asking questions about the Treasury's balance sheet. Long way from that yet... Now back to your regular programming... WaMu, Wachovia ... Is the MER transaction gonna happen? What will happen to the two remaining Investment Banks - Goldman and Morgan? Also the market cap of the largest US bank by "assets" - Citigroup has fallen dramatically - its now 3rd or 4th I think in terms of its market value... Ouch.. So what happens to Citi? These are all questions that seem to be playing out with surpising speed right here, right now in these historic days. I will never forget Sept 15 yesterday - the day when LEH and MER both got taken out.
Press Release
Release Date: September 16, 2008
For release at 9:00 p.m. EDT
The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday, with the full support of the Treasury Department, authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG) under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The secured loan has terms and conditions designed to protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers.
The Board determined that, in current circumstances, a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance.
The purpose of this liquidity facility is to assist AIG in meeting its obligations as they come due. This loan will facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner, with the least possible disruption to the overall economy.
The AIG facility has a 24-month term. Interest will accrue on the outstanding balance at a rate of three-month Libor plus 850 basis points. AIG will be permitted to draw up to $85 billion under the facility.
The interests of taxpayers are protected by key terms of the loan. The loan is collateralized by all the assets of AIG, and of its primary non-regulated subsidiaries. These assets include the stock of substantially all of the regulated subsidiaries. The loan is expected to be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the firm’s assets. The U.S. government will receive a 79.9 percent equity interest in AIG and has the right to veto the payment of dividends to common and preferred shareholders.
2008 Other Announcements
Ok so they backstopped AIG at a very high interest rate .. LIBOR + 8.5% .. AIG should be able to borrow... should be... from the open market knowing that the Fed/Treasury have 85B line of credit to AIG. If AIG takes the loan - Fed/T expects to be repaid by selling AIG assets. All in all its an OK move... I am still concerned about what happens if AIG's liabilities exceed their assets. I would HOPE that the Fed/T loan would be considered most senior. Also worrying is the Fed is using up a substantial amount of its 800B balance sheet quickly. The Treasury is backstopping the Fed. Eventually we'll be asking questions about the Treasury's balance sheet. Long way from that yet... Now back to your regular programming... WaMu, Wachovia ... Is the MER transaction gonna happen? What will happen to the two remaining Investment Banks - Goldman and Morgan? Also the market cap of the largest US bank by "assets" - Citigroup has fallen dramatically - its now 3rd or 4th I think in terms of its market value... Ouch.. So what happens to Citi? These are all questions that seem to be playing out with surpising speed right here, right now in these historic days. I will never forget Sept 15 yesterday - the day when LEH and MER both got taken out.
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
F&F Mess: Cost of Bailout
from www.nytimes.com
July 23, 2008
Cost of Loan Bailout, if Needed, Could Be $25 Billion
By DAVID M. HERSZENHORN
WASHINGTON — The proposed government rescue of the nation’s two mortgage finance giants will appear on the federal budget as a $25 billion cost to taxpayers, the independent Congressional Budget Office said on Tuesday even though officials conceded that there was no way of really knowing what, if anything, a bailout would cost.
The budget office said there was a better than even chance that the rescue package would not be needed before the end of 2009 and would not cost taxpayers any money. But the office also estimated a 5 percent chance that the mortgage companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could lose $100 billion, which would cost taxpayers far more than $25 billion.
The House is expected to act this week on housing legislation that includes the proposed rescue plan. Legislative language has not been finalized, but the Congressional Budget Office said its estimates were based on the plan by the Treasury Department and that it did not expect significant changes in the final bill.
According to the estimate, which was delivered in the form of a letter to the House Budget Committee chairman, Representative John M. Spratt Jr., Democrat of South Carolina, the director of the budget office, Peter R. Orszag, predicted that “a significant chance, probably better than 50 percent, that the proposed new Treasury authority would not be used before it expired at the end of December 2009.”
Mr. Orszag, at a briefing with reporters, acknowledged that pinpointing the eventual cost of the package was impossible. “There is very significant uncertainty involved here,” he said.
The uncertainty runs in both directions, with some government officials and market analysts suggesting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are fundamentally sound and will perform well over the long-term. Others, including some private equity managers, are pessimistic and predict heavy losses.
The rescue plan, put forward last week by the Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., would allow the Treasury Department to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to shore up the mortgage companies should they be at risk of collapse, either by extending credit or by purchasing equity in the companies, which are publicly traded.
Mr. Orszag said that the analysis by his office did not distinguish between the different forms of aid that might be offered — a credit line or a stock purchase — and that the analysis showed no short-term potential financial benefit for taxpayers even if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac perform well.
But he said the analysis found substantial risk for taxpayers if the companies had steep losses and would not say if his office had analyzed the implications of a full government takeover of the companies.
How much the government will end up spending on a rescue, if one is needed, would depend on many factors, he said, including sentiment on Wall Street. “A key question becomes how does the market view the entities?” he said.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are commonly referred to as government-sponsored entities, because of the long implicit guarantee that the federal government would step in to save them if they were ever in danger of collapse.
One thing that is certain as a result of the rescue proposal is that the guarantee of government aid is now much more explicit, and Mr. Orszag said that the government’s assurance that it would not let the companies fail would have to be included in any analysis of their long-term financial prospects.
Most immediately, the $25 billion cost estimate provides a precise amount that Congress will have to offset with spending cuts or tax increases if lawmakers intend to comply with “pay as you go” budget rules in the House. Lawmakers could also decide that the $25 billion should be viewed as emergency spending and simply added to the national debt.
There was little immediate reaction to the projections on Capitol Hill as lawmakers and staff members reviewed the complicated calculations and the various assumptions they were based on.
Mr. Spratt, the chairman of the Budget Committee, issued a statement praising the Congressional Budget Office for moving quickly to produce its analysis. “Estimating the fiscal impact of this proposal is complex and involves considerable uncertainty,” Mr. Spratt said. “And not everyone will necessarily agree with every aspect of C.B.O.’s analysis.”
But he added: “C.B.O. is performing its important institutional role by providing in a timely manner its best professional and independent assessment.”
The analysis by the Congressional Budget Office also offered a sobering assessment of the mortgage giants based on several different metrics.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Orszag said that the net worth of the mortgage giants at the end of the first quarter of 2008 was about $55 billion. He also said that the companies held more than $80 billion in capital at the end of March and for regulatory purposes were considered to be "adequately capitalized" by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
But on a fair value basis, the value of the mortgage companies’ assets exceeded their liabilities at the end of March by just $7 billion, a thin cushion considering liabilities at the time of $1.6 trillion, and an indication of why there have been numerous calls for the companies to raise additional capital. Mr. Orszag also noted that on July 11, before the Bush administration proposed its rescue plan, the total value of shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had fallen to a low of $11 billion. Shares in the companies are now worth about $20 billion.
The House is expected to vote on the larger package of housing legislation, including the rescue plan for the mortgage companies, as early as Wednesday, and the Senate is expected to quickly follow and send the bill to President Bush.
Among the issues that lawmakers have been debating is whether to exempt from the federal debt limit any expenditure that the Treasury Department makes on behalf of the mortgage companies. The current debt limit is $9.815 trillion and outstanding federal debt is roughly $9.5 trillion, leaving a cushion of $310 billion.
Congressional Democrats have expressed opposition to exempting the rescue plan from the debt limit, saying administration officials should come back to Congress for emergency authorization if additional spending is needed. Officials said it was probable that a compromise would be reached and the debt limit would still apply.
The housing legislation also includes the creation of a regulator for the mortgage companies, an agency apart from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which oversees the mortgage giants.
Some critics have questioned whether the new regulator would have sufficient authority to swiftly increase capital requirements — the amount of cash that the mortgage companies need to maintain to protect against losses.
In his letter to Mr. Spratt, Mr. Orszag suggested that simply enacting the proposed rescue plan could bolster the confidence of Wall Street in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
“Private markets might be sufficiently reassured to provide the GSE’s with adequate capital to continue operations without any infusion of funds from the Treasury,” he wrote. “during that time, it is possible that expectations about the duration and depth of the housing market downturn may brighten.”
But Mr. Orszag said his office had also consulted with market investors with a different outlook. “Many analysis and traders believe there is a significant likelihood that conditions in the housing and financial markets could deteriorate more than already reflected on the GSEs’ balance sheets,” he wrote, “and such continuing problems would increase the probability that this new authority would have to be used.”
Taking into account all of the different possibilities and sentiments, and measuring them against the budget “scorekeeping” rules, Mr. Orszag said his office had concluded “that the expected value of the federal budgetary cost from enacting this proposal would be $25 billion over fiscal years 2009 and 2010.”
25 bil huh? Try 10x that number....
July 23, 2008
Cost of Loan Bailout, if Needed, Could Be $25 Billion
By DAVID M. HERSZENHORN
WASHINGTON — The proposed government rescue of the nation’s two mortgage finance giants will appear on the federal budget as a $25 billion cost to taxpayers, the independent Congressional Budget Office said on Tuesday even though officials conceded that there was no way of really knowing what, if anything, a bailout would cost.
The budget office said there was a better than even chance that the rescue package would not be needed before the end of 2009 and would not cost taxpayers any money. But the office also estimated a 5 percent chance that the mortgage companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could lose $100 billion, which would cost taxpayers far more than $25 billion.
The House is expected to act this week on housing legislation that includes the proposed rescue plan. Legislative language has not been finalized, but the Congressional Budget Office said its estimates were based on the plan by the Treasury Department and that it did not expect significant changes in the final bill.
According to the estimate, which was delivered in the form of a letter to the House Budget Committee chairman, Representative John M. Spratt Jr., Democrat of South Carolina, the director of the budget office, Peter R. Orszag, predicted that “a significant chance, probably better than 50 percent, that the proposed new Treasury authority would not be used before it expired at the end of December 2009.”
Mr. Orszag, at a briefing with reporters, acknowledged that pinpointing the eventual cost of the package was impossible. “There is very significant uncertainty involved here,” he said.
The uncertainty runs in both directions, with some government officials and market analysts suggesting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are fundamentally sound and will perform well over the long-term. Others, including some private equity managers, are pessimistic and predict heavy losses.
The rescue plan, put forward last week by the Treasury secretary, Henry M. Paulson Jr., would allow the Treasury Department to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to shore up the mortgage companies should they be at risk of collapse, either by extending credit or by purchasing equity in the companies, which are publicly traded.
Mr. Orszag said that the analysis by his office did not distinguish between the different forms of aid that might be offered — a credit line or a stock purchase — and that the analysis showed no short-term potential financial benefit for taxpayers even if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac perform well.
But he said the analysis found substantial risk for taxpayers if the companies had steep losses and would not say if his office had analyzed the implications of a full government takeover of the companies.
How much the government will end up spending on a rescue, if one is needed, would depend on many factors, he said, including sentiment on Wall Street. “A key question becomes how does the market view the entities?” he said.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are commonly referred to as government-sponsored entities, because of the long implicit guarantee that the federal government would step in to save them if they were ever in danger of collapse.
One thing that is certain as a result of the rescue proposal is that the guarantee of government aid is now much more explicit, and Mr. Orszag said that the government’s assurance that it would not let the companies fail would have to be included in any analysis of their long-term financial prospects.
Most immediately, the $25 billion cost estimate provides a precise amount that Congress will have to offset with spending cuts or tax increases if lawmakers intend to comply with “pay as you go” budget rules in the House. Lawmakers could also decide that the $25 billion should be viewed as emergency spending and simply added to the national debt.
There was little immediate reaction to the projections on Capitol Hill as lawmakers and staff members reviewed the complicated calculations and the various assumptions they were based on.
Mr. Spratt, the chairman of the Budget Committee, issued a statement praising the Congressional Budget Office for moving quickly to produce its analysis. “Estimating the fiscal impact of this proposal is complex and involves considerable uncertainty,” Mr. Spratt said. “And not everyone will necessarily agree with every aspect of C.B.O.’s analysis.”
But he added: “C.B.O. is performing its important institutional role by providing in a timely manner its best professional and independent assessment.”
The analysis by the Congressional Budget Office also offered a sobering assessment of the mortgage giants based on several different metrics.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Orszag said that the net worth of the mortgage giants at the end of the first quarter of 2008 was about $55 billion. He also said that the companies held more than $80 billion in capital at the end of March and for regulatory purposes were considered to be "adequately capitalized" by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
But on a fair value basis, the value of the mortgage companies’ assets exceeded their liabilities at the end of March by just $7 billion, a thin cushion considering liabilities at the time of $1.6 trillion, and an indication of why there have been numerous calls for the companies to raise additional capital. Mr. Orszag also noted that on July 11, before the Bush administration proposed its rescue plan, the total value of shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had fallen to a low of $11 billion. Shares in the companies are now worth about $20 billion.
The House is expected to vote on the larger package of housing legislation, including the rescue plan for the mortgage companies, as early as Wednesday, and the Senate is expected to quickly follow and send the bill to President Bush.
Among the issues that lawmakers have been debating is whether to exempt from the federal debt limit any expenditure that the Treasury Department makes on behalf of the mortgage companies. The current debt limit is $9.815 trillion and outstanding federal debt is roughly $9.5 trillion, leaving a cushion of $310 billion.
Congressional Democrats have expressed opposition to exempting the rescue plan from the debt limit, saying administration officials should come back to Congress for emergency authorization if additional spending is needed. Officials said it was probable that a compromise would be reached and the debt limit would still apply.
The housing legislation also includes the creation of a regulator for the mortgage companies, an agency apart from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which oversees the mortgage giants.
Some critics have questioned whether the new regulator would have sufficient authority to swiftly increase capital requirements — the amount of cash that the mortgage companies need to maintain to protect against losses.
In his letter to Mr. Spratt, Mr. Orszag suggested that simply enacting the proposed rescue plan could bolster the confidence of Wall Street in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
“Private markets might be sufficiently reassured to provide the GSE’s with adequate capital to continue operations without any infusion of funds from the Treasury,” he wrote. “during that time, it is possible that expectations about the duration and depth of the housing market downturn may brighten.”
But Mr. Orszag said his office had also consulted with market investors with a different outlook. “Many analysis and traders believe there is a significant likelihood that conditions in the housing and financial markets could deteriorate more than already reflected on the GSEs’ balance sheets,” he wrote, “and such continuing problems would increase the probability that this new authority would have to be used.”
Taking into account all of the different possibilities and sentiments, and measuring them against the budget “scorekeeping” rules, Mr. Orszag said his office had concluded “that the expected value of the federal budgetary cost from enacting this proposal would be $25 billion over fiscal years 2009 and 2010.”
25 bil huh? Try 10x that number....
Be Patient!
from www.nytimes.com
July 23, 2008
Paulson Urges Americans to Be Patient on Economy
By MICHAEL M. GRYNBAUM
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., said on Tuesday that Americans need to remain patient as the economy works through its problems, and he warned of “continued stresses” in the months ahead before a full recovery can be made.
“Our markets won’t make progress in a straight line, and we should expect additional bumps in the road,” Mr. Paulson said in remarks at the New York Public Library in Midtown Manhattan. “We have been experiencing more bumps recently, and until the housing market stabilizes further we should expect some continued stresses in our financial markets.”
Although Mr. Paulson acknowledged the need for broad reforms of the nation’s existing regulatory structure, he sought to assure Americans that he expects the nation to “work through this period,” and “emerge stronger and better poised for robust growth.”
“The American people have every reason to remain confident that the U.S. banking system is sound,” he said.
Mr. Paulson spoke just a week after the government announced a plan to help prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant mortgage buyers that were recently at the center of widespread market anxiety. The episode, Mr. Paulson said, made it “all the more apparent” that systemic reforms are necessary.
“Now, more than ever, we need Fannie and Freddie out there, financing mortgages,” he said. “Their continued activity is central to the speed with which we emerge from this housing correction and remove the underlying uncertainty in our financial markets and financial institutions.”
Mr. Paulson said there were currently no plans for the companies to tap any federal money, even though the administration’s proposal calls for extending billions of dollars in credit if necessary. Asked about the effect of the plan on taxpayers, he said the credit lines offered a “flexibility” that “minimizes the likelihood they will be used.”
In his remarks, Mr. Paulson repeated his calls for greater transparency and effective regulation of the financial industry, saying such changes would “add to market stability and mitigate the likelihood that a failing institution can spur a systemic event.”
“We need to get to the point where large, complex financial institutions are not perceived to be too big or too interconnected to fail,” he said. He also singled out certain sophisticated markets — including over-the-counter credit derivatives — as particularly in need of greater oversight.
Mr. Paulson pointed to the recent failure of IndyMac Bancorp as an example of the government’s ability through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect depositors when a large bank collapses. “No one has or will lose a penny of insured deposits,” he said. “The F.D.I.C. took over the bank on a Friday, worked effectively over the weekend, and on Monday morning the bank reopened for business as usual.”
In a question-and-answer session after his speech, Mr. Paulson tried to end the appearance on a more positive note. “As I look around the world, I don’t see other industrial nations, developed industrial nations that have better long-term prospects than we do,” he said.
Limited Role Seen for Fed
KING OF PRUSSIA, Pa. (Reuters) — The Federal Reserve has a limited role in a government plan to provide financial support for the ailing mortgage finance companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the president of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, Charles I. Plosser, said Tuesday.
“We were not the lead instigators” in the plan, Mr. Plosser said after a speech to local business leaders. “The Fed is not intentionally seeking to expand its powers.”
Mr. Plosser is a voting member this year on the Fed’s interest rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee and is known to be one of the Fed’s more hawkish members.
So... which large, complex, interconnected institutions is Paulson talking about really? List of suspects are well known.
July 23, 2008
Paulson Urges Americans to Be Patient on Economy
By MICHAEL M. GRYNBAUM
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., said on Tuesday that Americans need to remain patient as the economy works through its problems, and he warned of “continued stresses” in the months ahead before a full recovery can be made.
“Our markets won’t make progress in a straight line, and we should expect additional bumps in the road,” Mr. Paulson said in remarks at the New York Public Library in Midtown Manhattan. “We have been experiencing more bumps recently, and until the housing market stabilizes further we should expect some continued stresses in our financial markets.”
Although Mr. Paulson acknowledged the need for broad reforms of the nation’s existing regulatory structure, he sought to assure Americans that he expects the nation to “work through this period,” and “emerge stronger and better poised for robust growth.”
“The American people have every reason to remain confident that the U.S. banking system is sound,” he said.
Mr. Paulson spoke just a week after the government announced a plan to help prop up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant mortgage buyers that were recently at the center of widespread market anxiety. The episode, Mr. Paulson said, made it “all the more apparent” that systemic reforms are necessary.
“Now, more than ever, we need Fannie and Freddie out there, financing mortgages,” he said. “Their continued activity is central to the speed with which we emerge from this housing correction and remove the underlying uncertainty in our financial markets and financial institutions.”
Mr. Paulson said there were currently no plans for the companies to tap any federal money, even though the administration’s proposal calls for extending billions of dollars in credit if necessary. Asked about the effect of the plan on taxpayers, he said the credit lines offered a “flexibility” that “minimizes the likelihood they will be used.”
In his remarks, Mr. Paulson repeated his calls for greater transparency and effective regulation of the financial industry, saying such changes would “add to market stability and mitigate the likelihood that a failing institution can spur a systemic event.”
“We need to get to the point where large, complex financial institutions are not perceived to be too big or too interconnected to fail,” he said. He also singled out certain sophisticated markets — including over-the-counter credit derivatives — as particularly in need of greater oversight.
Mr. Paulson pointed to the recent failure of IndyMac Bancorp as an example of the government’s ability through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to protect depositors when a large bank collapses. “No one has or will lose a penny of insured deposits,” he said. “The F.D.I.C. took over the bank on a Friday, worked effectively over the weekend, and on Monday morning the bank reopened for business as usual.”
In a question-and-answer session after his speech, Mr. Paulson tried to end the appearance on a more positive note. “As I look around the world, I don’t see other industrial nations, developed industrial nations that have better long-term prospects than we do,” he said.
Limited Role Seen for Fed
KING OF PRUSSIA, Pa. (Reuters) — The Federal Reserve has a limited role in a government plan to provide financial support for the ailing mortgage finance companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the president of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve, Charles I. Plosser, said Tuesday.
“We were not the lead instigators” in the plan, Mr. Plosser said after a speech to local business leaders. “The Fed is not intentionally seeking to expand its powers.”
Mr. Plosser is a voting member this year on the Fed’s interest rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee and is known to be one of the Fed’s more hawkish members.
So... which large, complex, interconnected institutions is Paulson talking about really? List of suspects are well known.
Friday, July 18, 2008
F&F: America's AAA rating
Jul 16th 2008
From www.financialarmageddon.com
The Beginning of the End for America's AAA Rating?
Over the past three days, the price of a credit default swap (or CDS, a form of "insurance" on creditworthiness) on 10-year U.S. government debt has risen by 8.3 basis points (one-hundreths of a percentage point), or 61 percent, to 21.8 basis points, and is now almost 80% higher than the median value of this CDS since it was first quoted on April 2.
There is no doubt that talk of a bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has spurred what could be a short-lived spike. Still, it makes you wonder if the market is starting to price in what many say is inevitable after years of profligacy and failed policies: a credit downgrade for the United States.
From www.financialarmageddon.com
The Beginning of the End for America's AAA Rating?
Over the past three days, the price of a credit default swap (or CDS, a form of "insurance" on creditworthiness) on 10-year U.S. government debt has risen by 8.3 basis points (one-hundreths of a percentage point), or 61 percent, to 21.8 basis points, and is now almost 80% higher than the median value of this CDS since it was first quoted on April 2.
There is no doubt that talk of a bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has spurred what could be a short-lived spike. Still, it makes you wonder if the market is starting to price in what many say is inevitable after years of profligacy and failed policies: a credit downgrade for the United States.
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